UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/1052
17 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 16 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CAMEROON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Acting upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a copy of the note verbale dated 12 December 1996 that Mr. Ferdinand Leopold Oyono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cameroon, addressed to the Office of the High Commissioner of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Yaoundé concerning the protest by the Cameroonian Government at Nigeria's implementation of electrification and drinking-water supply projects in Cameroonian territory in the town of Abana, district of Idabato, which is occupied by Nigerian troops.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of members of the Security Council and have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Jean Marc MPAY
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

96-36809 (E) 171296 171296

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Annex

Note verbale dated 12 December 1996 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cameroon addressed to the Office of the High Commissioner of Nigeria in Yaoundé

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cameroon presents its compliments to the Office of the High Commissioner of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Yaoundé and, further to its note verbale of 12 September 1996, in which the Cameroonian Government vigorously protested against the Nigerian drinking-water supply project in Cameroonian territory in the town of Abana (Idabato district), has the honour to request the Office to bring the following considerations to the attention of the Federal Nigerian Government:

While the territorial and maritime frontier dispute between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria is pending before the International Court of Justice, Nigerian authorities have just put into operation electrification and drinking-water supply projects, which, in spite of protests by Cameroon, they implemented in Abana, a town occupied by Nigerian troops and set up as an administrative unit of the federal Nigerian state of Cross River.

This further act not only constitutes a flagrant violation of the protective measures indicated to our two Governments on 15 March 1996 by the International Court of Justice, but is also contrary to the intention expressed by the Nigerian authorities in September 1996 to the United Nations goodwill mission to work in future for the maintenance of peace on the Bakassi Peninsula pending a judgment by the Court.

While recalling its firm choice in favour of a peaceful settlement through the Court of the dispute between the two States with regard to Bakassi, the Government of the Republic of Cameroon raises a strong protest against this further provocative act, which demonstrates the annexationist desires of the Nigerian State and is likely to disturb seriously the relative calm prevailing in the area. The Cameroonian Government, furthermore, intends to inform immediately all international bodies dealing with the Bakassi matter about this.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cameroon takes this opportunity to convey to the Office of the High Commissioner of the Federal Republic of Nigeria the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

(Signed) Ferdinand Leopold OYONO

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S/1996/1053
17 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of an incident that took place on 29 November 1996. The Iraqi fishing vessel Shatt al-Arab was fishing at a point five nautical miles south of Mina' al-Bakr when, at 0830 hours, it was subjected to a search by a United States frigate on station in the area. Personnel from the frigate searched all parts of the vessel and inspected its water and fuel tanks before leaving at 1030 hours.

I request your intervention with the United States of America with a view to halting its repeated actions against Iraqi civilian vessels, given that they constitute acts of aggression that are in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. I also affirm the legally established right of the Republic of Iraq to seek compensation for the damage caused to its property by these actions, in accordance with the principle of State responsibility.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-36911 (E) 181296 181296 191296

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Security Council

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S/1996/1054
17 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 17 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States, British and French aircraft continued over the period 1 to 15 December 1996 and that the aircraft in question carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

You are requested to intervene with the countries in question with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek legal compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State by these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-36917 (E) 181296 181296 191296

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Annex

Violations of Iraq's airspace and damage caused, 1-15 December 1996

1. In the northern region 61 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Zakho and Aqrah.

2. In the southern region 620 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Amarah, Qurnah, Artawi, Chabaish, Salman, Shatrah, Lasaf, Najaf, Qal'at Salih, Diwaniyah, Busayyah, Rifa'i, Qurnah, Hamzah, Nukhayb, Najaf South and Taqtaqanah.

3. On 14 occasions United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated the Republic of Iraq's airspace in the southern region before leaving in the direction of Kuwait.

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17 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Security Council's request in paragraph 14 of its resolution 1062 (1996) of 28 June 1996 that I report on the implementation of that resolution. My report on those aspects of the resolution which relate to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cyprus has already been submitted to the Council, on 10 December 1996 (S/1996/1016). The present report concerns my mission of good offices.

2. In the most recent report on my mission of good offices, dated 25 June 1996 (S/1996/467), I informed the Council that the considerable efforts undertaken during the previous 20 months had not succeeded in breaking the impasse in Cyprus. They had included a number of separate meetings between myself and the leaders of the two communities; direct talks between the two leaders hosted in October 1994 by my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel; various missions to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey by my then Special Representative, Mr. Joe Clark; and efforts by a number of interested Governments.

3. In resolution 1062 (1996), the Security Council reiterated its concern that there had been no progress towards an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem, reiterated that the status quo was unacceptable, and called upon the parties to demonstrate concretely their commitment to an overall settlement. The Council also called upon the two leaders to work with the Secretary-General and with the many countries supporting his mission of good offices to break the current impasse by establishing common ground on which direct negotiations could be resumed. The Council further recognized that the decision of the European Union concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus was an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement.

II. A REVIEW OF THE EFFORTS MADE SINCE JUNE 1996

4. In the course of the past six months, intensive efforts have been made to break the impasse and to create conditions for successful direct negotiations between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities.

5. As envisaged in my last report, my new Special Representative, Mr. Han Sung-Joo, undertook an extensive familiarization mission during the last week in June and the first half of July. In Cyprus he had two extended meetings with each of the two leaders, as well as meetings with political party leaders, businessmen and trade unionists on both sides. He went on to visit Athens and Ankara, as well as the capitals of a number of interested Governments, notably London, Moscow, Paris and Washington, and Dublin and Brussels for meetings with the Presidency of the European Union (EU) and the European Commission respectively. On subsequent occasions, he visited Bonn, London and Paris.

6. He found that the situation in the area remained very much as described in my last report. The positions of the two leaders appeared far apart on a number of issues. The Greek Cypriot leader emphasized that in order to avoid yet another unproductive direct meeting, it was necessary to ensure that sufficient common ground existed between the two sides before direct talks began. He identified five key areas in which common ground had to be established: security, EU membership, territory, sovereignty and political equality. The Turkish Cypriot leader, for his part, reaffirmed his readiness to meet for direct talks within the parameters of an equal partnership and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. He opposed any change in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, including Turkey's right of unilateral intervention. He was also opposed to Cyprus joining the European Union before Turkey, which, he believed, would negate what he regarded as the foundation of an overall settlement, notably bizonality and the Treaty of Guarantee. It was thus clear that direct talks would not at that time yield positive results.

7. My Special Representative reported to me that his meetings with a broad cross-section of the two communities had revealed a plurality of views and opinions. He underlined the critical importance of support from Greece and Turkey if negotiations were to succeed. He saw the issue of the accession of Cyprus to the European Union as an important new factor. The decision by EU to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the conclusion of its Intergovernmental Conference had in effect established a time-frame of approximately 18 months for the achievement of an overall settlement. It was therefore important for all concerned to redouble their efforts. He told me that this assessment was shared by his interlocutors in the capitals he had visited.

8. My Special Representative's second visit to the area in mid-September was overshadowed by the incidents on 11 and 14 August and their aftermath, which had raised tensions on the island to a high level (see S/1996/1016, paras. 2-11). His discussions with the leaders of the two communities therefore focused on ways of reducing the tension. To this end, he built upon the efforts of my Deputy Special Representative to encourage the two leaders to issue a joint statement which would make clear that the incidents did not reflect the true sentiments of the people of the two communities; that such incidents must never occur again; that they underscored the urgent need to resolve differences through negotiation; and that the leaders pledged themselves to redouble their efforts to cooperate with the Secretary-General and work tirelessly to reach an overall settlement. The Turkish Cypriot leader agreed to such a joint statement but the Greek Cypriot leader considered that, given the circumstances surrounding the incidents, a joint statement would not be appropriate. However,

he subsequently issued a statement of his own that the incidents must not dissuade the parties from pursuing with increased energy efforts to find an overall settlement under the auspices of the Secretary-General and that they could not be interpreted to mean that the two communities cannot live together in peace and prosperity in their common home, Cyprus. He also called upon both communities to make every effort to defuse the existing tensions.

9. Throughout the period covered by the present report, my Deputy Special Representative continued his regular meetings with the leaders of the two communities in an effort to promote the conditions for direct talks to achieve an overall settlement; to address the serious problems resulting from the August incidents and subsequent ones which also resulted in fatalities; and to lay the basis for the discussions which are currently under way between the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the military authorities on both sides on proposals for the reduction of tension along the ceasefire lines (see S/1996/1016). The Deputy Special Representative also remained in close touch with representatives of Governments that have been actively supporting my mission of good offices.

10. The third visit to the area by my Special Representative took place in mid-December. In Cyprus, he held two separate meetings with each of the two leaders. In Athens and Ankara, he met with senior Foreign Ministry officials. The main purpose of this visit was to assess the situation on the eve of my preparation of the present report. He found that the gap in the positions of the two sides had not narrowed and that each leader continued to express serious doubts about the true intentions of the other. This made it difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for direct talks. On the substance, the two leaders reiterated their well-known positions, as described in paragraph 6 above. The Greek Cypriot leader said that, in view of the campaign which would precede the presidential elections scheduled for February 1998, the window of opportunity for negotiations was likely to close by the autumn of 1997. My Special Representative reiterated to both leaders and to his interlocutors in Athens and Ankara the concern of the United Nations and the international community about the existing situation in Cyprus. He emphasized the urgent need for direct negotiations on an overall settlement and for intensified preparations for such negotiations to begin early in 1997, with the active support of Greece and Turkey.

11. In my last report I noted the growing international interest in the Cyprus problem, in particular among the permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the European Union. This has continued to intensify. During the period under review, senior officials from France, the EU Presidency (Ireland), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America visited Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, in some cases several times. Their purpose was to help overcome the existing impasse by exploring possible ways of bringing the positions of the two sides closer together and to seek greater support from Greece and Turkey. The missions by the Special Representative of the EU Presidency focused in particular on a possible EU contribution to an overall settlement in the context of the EU's decision to initiate accession negotiations with Cyprus. Such a contribution would include explanation of the benefits which EU membership would bring to all Cypriots and would also address Turkish Cypriot concerns about its implications for an

overall settlement of the Cyprus problem, particularly as regards bizonality, the Turkish guarantee and the relationship of Greece and Turkey with Cyprus. All the senior officials who undertook these missions recognized the importance of ensuring that the efforts of interested Governments are coordinated with those of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. To this end, regular consultations have taken place between the United Nations and representatives of interested Governments in Cyprus, at United Nations Headquarters and elsewhere.

III. OBSERVATIONS

12. The Cyprus problem has been at an impasse for a considerable time. Since my last report, the situation has deteriorated seriously and has been marked by a level of violence unprecedented since 1974. Frustration that a settlement has proved elusive for so long runs deep within both communities. Unless the political leadership on both sides manifests the necessary determination to negotiate an overall settlement and this process is fully supported by Greece and Turkey, the present unstable situation will persist and even lead to greater dangers.

13. The developments of recent months and the military build-up in Cyprus have underscored what the Security Council has pointed out for so long, that the status quo in Cyprus is most unstable and is not tenable. The events of recent months are a warning. If the current situation is allowed to persist, the consequences will be to the detriment of both communities.

14. The apparent calm that has prevailed for some years has lulled political leaders and the people of both communities into a false sense of stability. Many continue to believe that the situation will remain stable until the underlying dispute is resolved. Beneath the surface, however, the situation in Cyprus is changing, in terms both of the demographic composition of the island and of the relationship of the two communities with each other and to the outside world. Either the two communities will take control of their destiny by reaching an overall settlement on the basis that has already been agreed, or forces beyond their control will fundamentally change the situation on the island.

15. As has often been pointed out before, the exercise of good offices by successive Secretaries-General has, over the years, generated the substantive elements necessary to reach an overall agreement, as well as the procedures for achieving that objective. I refer especially to the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements in which the leaders of the two communities agreed on key principles of a solution, including the establishment of a bicommunal and bizonal federation whose independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity would be guaranteed. Other key principles are to be found in Security Council resolutions, in the Set of Ideas and in other ideas explored in recent years. Procedurally, it has become evident that an overall settlement can best be reached through mutual concessions in a comprehensive negotiating session which will continue as long as necessary to reach agreement.

16. As the Security Council recognized in resolution 1062 (1996), the decision of the European Union to open accession negotiations with Cyprus is an important

new development that should facilitate an overall settlement. That decision and the timetable that flows from it provide an additional important reason for both sides to redouble their efforts. It is clearly in the vital interests of both communities to reach a solution before accession negotiations begin. It is widely believed that the accession by Cyprus to EU membership in a manner consistent with the agreed basis for an overall settlement would offer both communities the opportunity for enhanced prosperity and security.

17. An urgent effort is accordingly required in 1997 to bring about early direct talks between the two leaders, in the manner described above, to negotiate an overall agreement. Both leaders should clearly and publicly commit themselves to such a process.

18. To facilitate this objective, preparations for direct negotiations are being intensified by the Secretariat. The extensive material which already exists is being reviewed and, as appropriate, updated and expanded, and additional material prepared, so that the United Nations will be in a position to help the leaders of the two communities reach common positions during their negotiations. In addition, more intensive contacts with the leaders of the two communities and with Greece and Turkey are planned for the new year, including longer visits to Cyprus and to the area by my Special Representative. I rely on continued support by interested Governments for these initiatives. I also call upon the Governments of Greece and Turkey, which have a special obligation to Cyprus, to become more active in support of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices.

19. The success of this effort will depend to an important extent on the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and reconciliation between the two communities. Both leaders must give tangible indications that they are seeking an overall settlement on the basis of <u>one</u> country and to ensure that their words and deeds are in harmony with that objective. Such a change in attitude cannot wait for a settlement; it must precede it and should be adopted without delay. The emphasis in their public statements and in their communications with each other must shift away from polemics and mutual accusations and towards their future relationship in a federal Cyprus. Messages of reconciliation and tolerance from both leaders and their communities are long overdue.

20. Both sides should also implement goodwill measures that give tangible indications of their good intentions and help create an atmosphere of confidence. Such measures could include the following: crossing with minimal formality by members of both communities at the Ledra Palace checkpoint (e.g., by only presenting identity cards); facilitating bicommunal contacts; cooperation and joint projects in areas of inter-communal concern such as the environment, water, health, education (including the elimination of biased and negative representations of each other) and the restoration of historic sites; youth and student exchanges; bicommunal sports events; elimination of provocative emblems and slogans; island-wide telephone communications; and bicommunal commercial activities and trade. I call on both leaders to take such measures.

21. Furthermore, it is important that the UNFICYP proposals for further unmanning, the prohibition of loaded weapons and a military code of conduct along the ceasefire lines be agreed to and implemented without delay.

22. The current situation offers the two communities, and the region, both a warning signal and an opportunity. The two leaders have a responsibility to their communities and to Cyprus as a whole to recognize the seriousness of the moment and to seize the opportunity it presents by agreeing to negotiate a comprehensive settlement on the basis of mutual concessions and to facilitate this process by conveying to each other in both words and deeds a message of reconciliation. In conclusion, I call upon both leaders to cooperate with my Special Representative and my Deputy Special Representative and with the Governments that support the Secretary-General's mission of good offices.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 58
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 13 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 4 December 1996, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-36959 (E) 191296 201296

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ANNEX

Letter dated 12 December 1996 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 21 November 1996 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations which contains allegations regarding "violations of the airspace of the Republic" (A/51/687-S/1996/963).

I would like to recall that previous similar allegations regarding so-called "airspace violations" were rejected in toto in my successive communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 22 October 1996 (A/51/551-S/1996/873). Since the present Greek Cypriot charges are no different or more credible than the ones previously made, they do not merit a detailed reply. I wish to reiterate briefly, however, that flights within the airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities of the State over which the usurper Greek Cypriot regime in the South has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever.

The aim of the Greek Cypriot administration in making these allegations is, as I have repeatedly pointed out before, to uphold the myth that it has sovereignty over the whole island and to provide a smokescreen for its intensive militarization campaign, coupled with its rejection of direct negotiations. As part of the implementation of the so-called "joint defence doctrine" with Greece, the Greek Cypriot side has recently stepped up its policy of escalation. Referring to the recent visit to South Cyprus by the Greek Defence Minister, Mr. Akis Tsohatzopoulos, the Greek Cypriot daily, Filelefθeros, of 23 November 1996 reported that "net decisions have been taken for the extension of the joint defence doctrine". Subsequent reports in the Greek Cypriot press and the joint press conference held by Greece's Defence Minister and his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Costas Iliades, on 24 November have revealed that among these "net decisions" are the following:

(a) The Greek Cypriot rearmament programme for the period from 1997 to 2001 will amount to a staggering 1.25 billion Cyprus pounds (1 Cyprus pound equals approximately 2.2 United States dollars);

(b) The Greek Cypriot administration will purchase S-300 long-range missiles. The procurement of CSS-6 and CSS-7 medium-range missiles is also envisaged;

(c) Greek Defence Minister Tsohatzopoulos has pledged that in 1997 Greece will establish, using refuelling and AWACS planes, an "aerial bridge" between Crete and South Cyprus. According to Tsohatzopoulos, this will become possible next year, upon the completion of the airbase being constructed for the Greek Air Force in Paphos, South Cyprus;

(d) With the support of Greece, the present air unit of the Greek Cypriot National Guard will be upgraded to the level of a fully equipped air force. The

Greek Cypriot arsenal will include attack helicopters, Mirage 2000 and Tornado warplanes, as well as Mirage F1 pilot training planes.

Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot daily, Filelefttheros, of 3 December 1996 reports that the Greek Cypriot administration will be purchasing 40 new T-80 tanks and that an additional 1,500 professional soldiers will be hired from Greece to serve in the Greek Cypriot National Guard.

I trust that the parties that are interested in a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question will call upon the Greek Cypriot side to desist from its militarization campaign, which undermines prospects for a peaceful settlement. The other side must come to realize that the interests of the two peoples in Cyprus lie in negotiating on the basis of the existing parameters for a peaceful solution, and not in pursuing a policy of escalation and adventurism.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda items 24 and 145
LAW OF THE SEA
UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Identical letters dated 18 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement concerning the Iranian occupation of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, three islands that form an integral part of the sovereign territory of the United Arab Emirates. The statement is part of the final communiqué adopted by the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its seventeenth session, held in Doha, Qatar, from 7 to 9 December 1996 under the chairmanship of His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani, Amir of Qatar.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 24 and 145, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad J. SAMHAN
Permanent Representative

96-37047 (E) 201296 201296

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ANNEX

Excerpt from the final communiqué adopted by the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its seventeenth session, held in Doha, Qatar, from 7 to 9 December 1996

The occupation of the three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, and relations with Iran

(a) The occupied islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates

The Supreme Council reviewed recent developments in the situation with regard to Iran's occupation of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates. It noted that the Iranian Government was continuing to take measures aimed at perpetuating its occupation of the islands by pursuing a policy of imposing faits accomplis by use of force, thereby persisting in the further pursuit of its unwarranted and provocative measures. The Council reiterated its profound regret that the Islamic Republic of Iran was maintaining its refusal to respond positively to the repeated, earnest and sincere calls for a peaceful resolution of the dispute that have been made by the United Arab Emirates, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Damascus Declaration countries, the Council of the League of Arab States and the Arab Summit Conference. The Council further expressed its disapproval of the successive Iranian measures taken on the islands and its continuing concern at the possible consequences of the Iranian Government's insistence on pursuing a policy of imposing faits accomplis by force. Such measures represent a violation of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates and an infringement of its rights with respect to the islands. They also jeopardize security and stability in the region and are incompatible with the principles and norms of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the principles of good-neighbourliness and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity as they concern the States of the region.

The Council renews its affirmation of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the islands in question and of its unconditional support for all the peaceful measures the United Arab Emirates is taking with a view to restoring the exercise of that sovereignty. It reiterates its call to the Iranian Government to end its occupation of the islands, to desist from pursuing a policy of imposing faits accomplis by force, to suspend the implementation of any measures taken unilaterally, to remove any facilities unilaterally installed on the islands and to resolve the ongoing dispute in a peaceful manner in accordance with the principles and norms of international law, including agreement to refer the question to the International Court of Justice.

(b) Relations with Iran

The Council discussed developments in connection with relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of its established position centred on the importance of relations based on good-neighbourliness, commitment to the principles of mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of

other States, avoidance of the use or threat of use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles and norms of international law, and the need for action to ensure the maintenance of security and stability in the region.

In this context, the Council expressed deep concern that the Islamic Republic of Iran had deployed surface-to-surface missiles in the Arabian Gulf and even on the three occupied islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, thereby placing the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and their vital installations under direct threat. It further expressed its concern at Iran's continuing endeavour to acquire and build an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and to have a conventional and non-conventional weapons capability that surpasses its legitimate defence needs. Accordingly, in light of the international strategic importance of the Gulf region, the Council renewed its call to the international community and the relevant international organizations to make active efforts to transform that region into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 33
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 18 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning Israel's attacks on southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa and the arbitrary practices against the civilian inhabitants in which it engages on a daily basis, I have the honour to notify you of the series of such incidents that took place in November 1996.

1 November 1996

At 0600 hours outlying areas of Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar, Arabsalim, Kafr Rumman and Habbush, the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills and areas along the Nab' al-Tasah came under Israeli artillery fire. The bombardment lasted for one hour.

At 0900 hours outlying areas of Qilya, Zillaya, Suhmur and Yuhmur came under Israeli artillery fire. The bombardment lasted for one hour.

At 1100 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Iqlim al-Tuffah area at low altitude and carried out a number of mock attacks.

3 November 1996

At 1100 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps.

At 1200 hours outlying areas of Ayn Bu Siwar, Arabsalim and Luwayzah and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire. A woman, Layla Hashim, was injured, and four dwellings were damaged.

At 1500 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at medium altitude.

At 1540 hours outlying areas of Jba' came under Israeli artillery fire.

4 November 1996

At 2110 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon at high altitude.

5 November 1996

At 0715 hours outlying areas of Majdal Silm, Qabrikha and Shaqra came under Israeli artillery fire.

6 November 1996

At 1000 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Sidon area and the nearby camps.

9 November 1996

At 1215 hours the town of Sidqin and the Asi locality came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1430 hours outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Jibal al-Butm and Zibqin came under Israeli artillery fire. This was accompanied by helicopter overflights.

At 1500 hours outlying areas of Kafra and Yatar came under Israeli artillery fire. A man, Rashid Kurani, received shrapnel wounds that required hospital treatment.

At 1640 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Jba' and Ayn Bu Siwar.

At 1800 hours Israeli warplanes carried out mock attacks on outlying areas of Kafra and Yatar.

At 2030 hours outlying areas of Jba' came under Israeli artillery fire. A number of dwellings were damaged.

At 1715 hours outlying areas of Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar and Arabsalim and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

12 November 1996

At 1130 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitude, carrying out mock attacks and breaking the sound barrier.

At 1320 hours outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm in the Tyre district came under artillery fire from Israeli forces in the border strip.

13 November 1996

At 1630 hours outlying areas of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and Zawtar al-Gharbiyah came under Israeli artillery fire.

19 November 1996

At 0900 hours Israeli aircraft attacked outlying areas of Mlita and Jabal Safi.

At 0915 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area at medium altitude.

At 1840 hours Israeli warplanes and helicopters overflew the Iqlim al-Tuffah area at low altitude. The helicopters strafed the wadis and areas along the Nab' al-Tasah. Outlying areas of Arabsalim, Jarju' and Ayn Bu Siwar and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills also came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2100 hours outlying areas of Jba' came under Israeli artillery fire.

21 November 1996

At 1100 hours an Israeli aircraft launched a heat balloon in the Baydar locality of Aytit. A man, Ali Muhsin, received burns.

24 November 1996

At 0945 hours outlying areas of Dallafah and Qilya and the hills surrounding Ayn al-Tinah in the Western Bekaa district came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1400 hours outlying areas of Tibnin, Haddatha, Bra'shit and Ayta al-Jabal in the Bint Jubayl district came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1730 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at low altitude.

At 1745 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area at low altitude.

25 November 1996

At 0900 hours Israeli aircraft overflew Sidon at high altitude.

At 1600 hours outlying areas of Frun and Ghanduriyah came under Israeli artillery fire. No casualties were reported.

At 1630 hours Israeli aircraft overflew the Nabatiyah area at medium altitude.

At 1855 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Sidon area at low altitude.

26 November 1996

At 0600 hours Saydun and Jazzin came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1810 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area at low altitude.

At 1815 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Sidon area and the nearby camps as well as the Nabatiyah area, carrying out mock attacks.

At 1850 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Rumaylah, Jiyah and Sa'diyat areas in the Shuf district at low altitude.

At 1900 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Sidon area and the nearby camps at low altitude.

27 November 1996

At 1800 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitude.

At 1815 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at low altitude.

At 2215 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area at low altitude.

28 November 1996

At 1530 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon at high altitude.

30 November 1996

Outlying areas of Arabsalim, Jarju' and Ayn Bu Siwar, areas along the Nab' al-Tasah and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli bombardment.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns the continued Israeli occupation and these fresh attacks and arbitrary practices inflicted on the Lebanese population, which have left a number of casualties and have caused further serious damage to property.

Like previous attacks, this new series is in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and constitutes a breach of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of international law and of basic human rights.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/51/759
S/1996/1059
19 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 58
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 17 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 17 December 1996, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex, which contains a letter dated 17 December 1996, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 17 December 1996 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter dated 17 December 1996, addressed to you by His Excellency President Rauf R. Denktaş, in connection with the recent acceleration in the Greek Cypriot military build-up and escalation in southern Cyprus in the context of the "joint defence doctrine" with Greece, and the danger it poses to the peace and stability of the region (see appendix).

I shall be grateful if the text of the present letter and its appendix could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

APPENDIX

Letter dated 17 December 1996 from Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, addressed to the Secretary-General

The Greek Cypriot side has recently stepped up its strategy of military escalation and the military build-up in south Cyprus has reached massive proportions, with the announcement of plans to buy sophisticated offensive weapons systems in addition to the already acquired tanks and missiles.

Over recent years, the Greek Cypriot side has intensified its rearmament campaign in line with the so-called "joint defence doctrine" signed with Greece, with new additions being made to the Greek Cypriot military arsenal every day.

In early December, the Greek Cypriot Council of Ministers has increased the defence levy from 3 to 4 per cent, in order to generate additional funds for the excessive military purchases. The Greek Cypriot administration has recently announced that a sum of US$ 2,632 million will be allocated for arms purchases in accordance with the next five-year defence programme.

It has been reported in the Greek Cypriot press that the new five-year arming programme of the Greek Cypriot National Guard was taken up during the visit to south Cyprus of the Greek Defence Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos between 21 and 24 November 1996. According to the decisions taken during this visit, the Greek Cypriot side will purchase new missile systems, including Russian made S-300 V anti-aircraft missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, Mil-28 attack helicopters, war-planes and tanker aircraft. With the purchase of S-300V, CSS-6 and CSS-7 missiles, it is stressed, the Greek Cypriot side will acquire the capability to hit targets in Turkey. It has also been confirmed that the construction at Paphos in south Cyprus of an air force base for Greece will be completed by the end of 1997. It has been reported that similar airfields will be built on the Aegean Islands. It will be recalled that the construction of a naval base between Zyyi and Moni in south Cyprus is already under way.

The armaments programme of the Greek Cypriot side was also discussed during the recent visit of the Greek Cypriot Defence Minister, Mr. Eliades to Athens. Mr. Eliades told reporters on 11 December 1996 that "there was a total identity of views on all issues (between Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration) and that programmes concerning infrastructure works (i.e., Paphos military base), armaments and training would go ahead as planned".

It was also announced that in addition to the annual Nikiforos/Toxotis exercises scheduled for October 1997, joint military exercises between south Cyprus and Greece, under the code-name Bergina, would be held in south Cyprus in March 1997 with the participation of Greek warplanes. It is rather interesting, to say the least, that this announcement follows the rejectionist stand the Greek-Greek Cypriot front took on the United States proposal to ban military over-flights in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides, upon his return to south Cyprus from the meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Lisbon, had made it clear that the Greek Cypriot side was not prepared to accept the idea of having a moratorium on over-flights

for a specific period of time. The implementation of the "joint defence doctrine", he stressed, would not be undermined in any way and the construction of military bases in south Cyprus would continue as planned.

That the so-called "joint defence doctrine" is being implemented in a totally provocative and aggressive manner cannot be disputed. A case in point demonstrating the true nature of the joint Greek-Greek Cypriot front has been the massive joint military exercises carried out under slogans "Greece is here" and "Cyprus Hellenism is secure" during October 1996. The joint manoeuvres, which turned out to be a real show of force, with the participation of the Greek Air Force and Navy were clearly offensive in character, involving war scenarios designed to be conducted in areas encircling the island with the professed aim of "recapturing lost territory". It is noteworthy that Mr. Clerides who stressed during the exercises that "the joint military doctrine is here to stay and will proceed as planned" had already made their ultimate aim clear in pursuing this confrontational posture when he stated that "... when the time comes, Hellenism will be resurrected in north Cyprus" (Simerini, 4 April 1996).

The Greek Cypriot administration spends in excess of $2 million daily on armaments which means it spends a higher percentage of its gross domestic product on arms than most other countries, including the United States. Furthermore, Greek nationals have already been recruited into the Greek Cypriot National Guard under a recent scheme to boost the active strength of the Greek Cypriot army by adding up to 5,000 new personnel. At present, the Greek Cypriot army has 80,000-100,000 reservists and a large number of paramilitary forces (militia) in addition to an active force of 20,000. The Greek Cypriot Defence Minister, Mr. Eliades, has proposed to increase the Greek army volunteers, which stand presently at 500 to 1,500, and to place Greek Cypriot reservists on the front lines.

The continuing rearmament programme in south Cyprus, construction of an air base in Paphos and the planned purchase of medium and long-range missiles are clearly offensive steps, rather than defensive as alleged by the Greek Cypriot side, and constitute a serious provocation towards the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey. Such confrontational and negative posture will further exacerbate the already tense situation and increase tension both in the island and the region. The following words of the spokesman for the Greek Cypriot administration, Mr. Yannakis Cassoulides, encapsulates the aggressive nature of the military preparations in south Cyprus: "If we are sure that our armed forces will victoriously reach Kyrenia, and the reverse will not happen enabling the Turks to reach Limassol then we may resort to armed struggle" (Astra Radio in the south).

The policy of escalation and tension pursued by the Greek Cypriot side and Greece threatens the peace and equilibrium in our region. It needs to be stressed that the countries which continue to sell arms to the Greek Cypriot administration will bear the responsibility for any new conflict in the region which may arise as a result of the adventurous policies of the Greek Cypriot administration.

I have repeatedly called upon the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides, to resume talks in order to reduce the tension in the island, to initiate a

dialogue and to put our heads together as early as possible with a view to preventing yet another tragedy and finding a mutually acceptable resolution to end our differences. I expressed my belief that the historic responsibility to prevent another crisis, to reverse the present dangerous trend of escalation and to achieve a resolution rests with Mr. Clerides and I, as elected leaders of our respective communities. Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriot leader has not only failed to respond positively to my calls, but has opted to continue with the policy of escalation and tension in the island.

It is incumbent upon the international community to make a concerted effort to make sure that the Greek Cypriot side abandons its current confrontational posture before it is too late, and starts engaging in meaningful dialogue with the Turkish Cypriot side, within the framework of your good offices mission, in the interest of a peaceful solution in Cyprus.

(Signed) Rauf R. Denktaş
President

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

DIST.
GENERAL

*A/51/760
S/1996/1060
19 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 21 (b)
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF
ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE:
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OR REGIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 19 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the decision taken on 15 November 1996 by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation concerning the position of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the use of Security Council sanctions.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 21 (b), and also of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. LAVROV

96-37231 (E) 231296 231296

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ANNEX

Resolution taken on 15 November 1996 by the State Duma concerning the position of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the use of Security Council sanctions

At the current time, the United Nations Security Council is once again considering the question of the imposition of sanctions, this time against the Sudan.

Unconditionally condemning all manifestations of terrorism, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation considers that all cases of international terrorism must be carefully investigated and the perpetrators punished; however, in this regard, the principle of the collective responsibility of the entire population of a given State should not be applied.

The State Duma views as inadmissible attempts to impose on the Security Council decisions on the introduction of sanctions in order to settle accounts with objectionable regimes in various States of the world. As a rule, the use of sanctions does not contribute to the definitive solution of acute international problems, and the use of sanctions imposes suffering, not on the political leadership, but, primarily, on the peaceful population. Considerable economic damage has been caused to many States, including the Russian Federation.

The State Duma considers that the international community and the Security Council must be extremely cautious in considering the taking of decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individual States. The use of this mechanism for exerting pressure must be viewed as an exceptional means which may be utilized only in cases where the political methods of achieving a settlement have been completely exhausted. The existence of a real threat to peace and international security is the paramount criteria for determining the advisability of using coercive measures. In imposing sanctions, the principle of their proportionality to the threat in question must be observed; the conditions and mechanism for their subsequent lifting must be determined; and humanitarian limitations as well as time-limits for the application of sanctions must be established. In this regard, decisions which may aggravate the situation of the civilian population ought to be avoided. There is also a need to develop a set of measures to minimize the economic damage caused to other States in using sanctions. Repeating the mistakes made in imposing the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Iraq and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is inadmissible.

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation decides:

1. To recommend that the President of the Russian Federation should instruct the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to take measures precluding the possibility of the use by the Security Council of sanctions causing serious damage to the economic interests of the Russian Federation, unless at the same time an effective international mechanism is set

up to compensate for economic losses incurred by the Russian side as a result of participation in the sanctions;

2. To recommend that the Government of the Russian Federation should conduct consultations with interested parties on questions relating to the drafting of a convention to combat terrorism;

3. To instruct the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, the State Duma Committee on Security and the State Duma Committee on Legislation and the Judicial and Legal Reform to develop, in coordination with federal executive bodies, a set of measures determining the procedure for participation by the Russian Federation in economic sanctions on the basis of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Charter of the United Nations and also to speed up the elaboration of draft federal laws governing participation by the Russian Federation in measures to combat international terrorism;

4. To instruct the Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to bring the contents of this decision to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the heads of Government of the States that are members of the Security Council.

G. N. SELEZNEV
Chairman of the State Duma of the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Moscow, 15 November 1996

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/1061
20 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 18 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to notify you of continued violations of the ceasefire resolution and the Tehran agreement concerning the area of separation between Iraq and Iran that were committed by the Iranian side between 25 September and 21 November 1996, as shown in the list annexed hereto.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Permanent Representative

96-37270 (E) 201296 201296

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Annex

Iranian violations of the ceasefire and the 1991 Tehran agreement between 25 September and 21 November 1996

1. 25 September 1996

The Philippine tug Queen Bird and its crew were attacked in the Shahiniyah area south of Umm al Kasar inland by five persons armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and dressed as Arabs. Coming from the direction of the Iranian shore in a fishing boat, they seized the crew and stole their personal possessions. Two of the crew members were wounded in the incident.

2. 28 September 1996

At 1800 hours an Iranian patrol consisting of some 12 men with light weapons approached to within 600 metres of the Mundhiriyah post opposite Zadi Najaf. It produced a map, and the area was reconnoitred.

3. 28 September 1996

At 2230 hours a group of three Iranians approached the Mundhiriyah post to a point 400 metres inside Iraqi territory. They fled when the soldiers manning the post were obliged to fire in their direction.

4. 28 September 1996

The Iranian Khumrawi complex and the frontier barrier point failed to turn on their lights until 2100 hours. In the morning, an Iranian vehicle had been seen coming from the Iranian side inside Iraqi territory.

5. 29 September 1996

At 1500 hours a number of boats belonging to Iraqis, including two belonging to the Khuljan fishing and fish-marketing company, Khuljan I (No. 214) and Khuljan II (No. 213), were fishing in our territorial waters near Khawr al-Amayah harbour when they were seized by an Iranian patrol and escorted to the harbour at Bandar Khomeini in the northern part of the Arabian Gulf. There, the crew members were blindfolded and taken to prison. On 30 September they were brought before the competent court and asked a number of questions, including questions on where they had been fishing and who owned the boats. They were then returned to the harbour and told to go home, all the boats having been released except for Khuljan I and Khuljan II. When the two masters refused to return to Iraq without their boats, they were forcibly returned to Faw on an Iraqi boat, the Najaf, owned by Tawfiq Taha.

6. 30 September 1996

The Iranian authorities detained the following Iraqi boat owners while they were fishing in Iraqi territorial waters: Muhammad Khalifah Hasan, Hamid Ya'qub Yusuf, Tawfiq Taha Halub and Tariq Harun Yusuf.

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7. 25 October 1996

At 1200 hours an Iranian patrol boat intercepted five Iraqi fishing boats while they were operating south of Mina' al-Amiq in Iraqi territorial waters. There were three civilians on the Iranian boat, one of them carrying a GC weapon, and the boat had a machine-gun mounted in the bows. The Iraqi boats were escorted to Bandar Khomeini. At 1700 hours on 30 October, all the boats were released together with their 50 crew members.

8. 29 October 1996

At 1930 hours a grey fibreglass Iranian patrol boat with a 48-horsepower Yamaha engine carrying three civilians approached the Iraqi side in the Sayhan area at coordinates 330565. The Iranian boat fired at the Iraqi patrols using a GC weapon.

9. 30 October 1996

At 1645 hours the Iranian side, using a small boat with 12 civilians on board, proceeded to film and photograph the Iranian vessel Ardashir, submerged in the Sayhan area at coordinates 308580, with a video camera and a still camera.

10. 10 November 1996

At 1300 hours, while they were fishing near Mina' al-Amiq, the Iraqi boats Al-Baqir 194, Al-Miqdam and Al-Qasim were approached by an Iranian patrol boat with a machine-gun mounted in the bows. There were six persons on board, one of whom spoke Arabic. They escorted the Iraqi boats and their crews of 31 fishermen to Bandar Khomeini where they were detained. They were thence brought before a court on charges of illegal fishing and were each made to give an undertaking not to fish in Iranian waters. On 19 and 22 November the boats were released together with their crews.

11. 17 November 1996

An Iranian patrol boat with seven Persian-speaking civilians on board and a machine-gun mounted in the bows seized an Iraqi boat with six persons on board while it was fishing in the vicinity of Mina' al-Bakr and Mina' al-Amiq and escorted them to the Iranian side. On 21 November 1996 the boat and its crew were released.

12. 21 November 1996

While a salvage team belonging to the Iraqi Ports Authority was at the entry to the Shatt al Arab channel examining the submerged crane Antarah with a view to refloating it, the team was subjected to armed intimidation by an Iranian patrol which demanded that it should leave the location and refused to allow it to work.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
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S/1996/1062
23 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 10 December 1996 (S/1996/1016 and Add.1),

Welcoming also the report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus of 17 December 1996 (S/1996/1055),

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 31 December 1996,

Reaffirming its earlier relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994 and 1062 (1996) of 28 June 1996,

Gravely concerned by the deteriorating situation in Cyprus and by the fact that intercommunal tensions on the island have escalated and, over the last six-month period, violence along the ceasefire lines has reached a level not seen since 1974 as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 10 December 1996,

Concerned also at the increased use of and threat to use violence against the personnel of UNFICYP,

Noting the beginning of indirect discussions through the UNFICYP Force Commander between the military authorities of both sides on measures aimed at reduction of military tensions,

Reiterating its concern that negotiations on a final political solution have been at an impasse for too long,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 30 June 1997;

2. Deplores the violent incidents of 11 and 14 August, 8 September and 15 October 1996, which resulted in the tragic deaths of three Greek Cypriot

civilians and one member of the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces, as well as injuries to civilians and UNFICYP personnel, in particular the unnecessary and disproportionate use of force by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side, as well as the largely passive role played by the Cypriot police in response to civilian demonstrations;

3. Reminds both sides of their obligation to prevent violence directed against UNFICYP personnel, particularly those involving firearms, which inhibit UNFICYP from carrying out its mandated responsibilities, and demands that they ensure UNFICYP complete freedom of movement and extend their full cooperation to UNFICYP;

4. Emphasizes the need to maintain law and order and, in this context, demands that both parties prevent unauthorized incursions into the buffer zone, and respond immediately and responsibly to any demonstrations which violate the buffer zone and any demonstrations near the buffer zone that might lead to an increase in tensions;

5. Calls upon the parties to accept as a package, without delay or preconditions, the reciprocal measures proposed by UNFICYP, namely: (a) to extend the 1989 unmanning agreement to other areas where the two sides remain in close proximity to each other; (b) to prohibit loaded weapons along the ceasefire lines; and (c) to adopt a code of conduct, based on the concept of minimal force and proportional response, to be followed by troops on both sides along the ceasefire lines, and expresses its disappointment that no progress has been made towards implementing these measures thus far;

6. Further calls upon the military authorities on both sides:

(a) To clear all minefields and booby-trapped areas inside the buffer zone without further delay, as requested by UNFICYP;

(b) To cease military construction in the immediate vicinity of the buffer zone;

(c) To refrain from any military exercises along the buffer zone;

7. Reiterates grave concern about the excessive levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernized, including by the introduction of sophisticated weaponry, as well as the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, which threaten to raise tensions both on the island and in the region and complicate efforts to negotiate an overall political settlement;

8. Calls again upon all concerned to commit themselves to a reduction in defence spending and a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, annex), stresses the importance of eventual demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus as an objective in the context of an overall comprehensive

settlement, and calls upon the Secretary-General to continue to promote efforts in this direction;

9. Expresses continuing concern about military exercises in the region, including overflights in the airspace of Cyprus by military fixed-wing aircraft, which have markedly increased political tension on the island and undermined efforts towards achieving a settlement;

10. Reiterates that the status quo is unacceptable and stresses its support for the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and the importance of the concerted efforts to work with the Secretary-General towards an overall comprehensive settlement;

11. Welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and of those working in support, to prepare the ground for open-ended direct negotiations in the first half of 1997 between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities in order to secure an overall settlement;

12. Calls upon the parties to cooperate with the Special Representative to that end, as well as with his intensified preparatory work in the first months of 1997 with the objective of clarifying the main elements of an overall settlement;

13. Underlines that the success of this process will require the creation of genuine mutual confidence on both sides and the avoidance of actions which increase tension and calls upon the leaders of both communities to create a climate of reconciliation and confidence;

14. Reaffirms its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;

15. Welcomes the continuous efforts by UNFICYP to implement its humanitarian mandate in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island, and Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part, and regrets that there has been no further progress on the implementation of recommendations arising out of the humanitarian review undertaken by UNFICYP in 1995;

16. Welcomes the continuing efforts of the United Nations and others in the international community to promote bi-communal events, regrets the obstacles which have been placed in the way of such contacts, and strongly urges all concerned, and especially the Turkish Cypriot community leadership, to lift all obstacles to such contacts;

17. Reaffirms that the decision of the European Union concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus is an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement;

18. Requests the Secretary-General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring, and to present any new considerations he may have in this regard;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 June 1997 on the implementation of this resolution;

20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/1063
20 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 12 of resolution 1080 (1996) and of my letter of 12 December 1996 (S/1996/1036) with which I transmitted to the Security Council the report I had received earlier that day from Mr. Raymond Chrétien following his mission to the Great Lakes region as my Special Envoy. Its purpose is to update the Council on developments in that region since my report of 29 November 1996 (S/1996/993) and to inform the Council of the action which, after consultation with the Secretary-General elect, I propose to take in response to my Special Envoy's recommendations.

2. In examining my Special Envoy's report, I have been conscious that, while the humanitarian crisis may have eased somewhat, enormous challenges remain. Little progress has been made in easing international tensions within the region. Internal conflicts persist. The humanitarian crisis created by the various conflicts is itself far from being resolved. With the return to Rwanda of an estimated 560,000 refugees from eastern Zaire and more than 235,000 from the United Republic of Tanzania since 1 December, urgent attention must now be devoted to the social, economic and political integration of these returnees. So far they are reported to have been well received by the people of Rwanda and by the Rwandan Government. Meanwhile, in Zaire, the large number of Rwandan and Burundian refugees who moved further west into that country and the estimated 250,000 internally displaced persons of Zairian nationality, as well as some 500,000 other Zairians affected by the conflict, require immediate humanitarian assistance. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have only limited access to these people. Another pressing concern is the future of the personnel of the former Rwandese Armed Forces (FAR) and the extremist militias (Interahamwe) connected with them, as well as their families and the bona fide refugees they may be keeping as hostages.

II. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 26 NOVEMBER 1996

96-37219 (E) 201296

3. In Rwanda, tens of thousands of persons have been suddenly forced to find new housing, as they vacate houses owned by the returning refugees. No major conflict related to property issues has so far been reported, but the shortage of housing remains a potential flashpoint. Given the existence of other vulnerable groups such as genocide survivors and old-caseload returnees who fled the country in 1959, it is imperative that the international community provide vigorous support to the efforts of the Government of Rwanda to handle the large-scale influx and take urgent steps to improve the judicial system. As I have already indicated to the Council (S/1996/993, para. 23), an increase in the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation is also imperative.

4. As regards the situation in Zaire, a recent development was the return, on 17 December 1996, of President Mobutu. On 18 December, he signed a decree appointing General Mahele as Chief of Staff of the Zairian Army. The following day he met Zaire's political leaders to discuss the situation in the eastern part of the country and the need to establish a crisis Government.

5. Zaire continues to consider itself the victim of aggression on the part of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda whose regular armies, it alleges, have violated its territorial integrity and its recognized international borders. Rwanda and Burundi, for their part, deny Zaire's allegations and do not consider themselves at war with that country. As regards Uganda, the Zairian Government, in a communiqué to myself and the members of the Security Council dated 1 December 1996 (S/1996/994, annex), has accused Uganda of introducing troops armed with tanks and armoured vehicles into Zairian territory in support of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and of engaging the Zairian armed forces in combat near the town of Beni close to the border between the two countries. The Government of Uganda has categorically refuted these allegations and, in a communiqué to the Council dated 9 December 1996 (S/1996/1038, annex), stated that the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) have at no time crossed the border into Zairian territory and that, on the contrary, Uganda had been invaded on 13 November 1996 by forces originating from inside Zairian territory. According to the Ugandan Government, these forces occupied towns within Uganda and were then repulsed by UPDF which, in hot pursuit, forced them to retreat into Zaire.

6. The United Nations, which has no military observers in the region, is not in a position to verify independently any of these allegations or counter-allegations. For the same reason, I am not in a position to describe in any detail developments in the military situation in eastern Zaire since the Banyamulenge seized a large tract of territory in North Kivu and South Kivu in October and November of this year.

7. On 10 December 1996, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights opened a human rights office in Kinshasa. Two experts will follow the human rights situation in the country and advise the authorities on matters relating to the promotion and protection of human rights.

8. In Burundi, hostilities between the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD) and the army continue, particularly in the north of the country, and have already led to large-scale displacement, including the flight of Hutu refugees into the United Republic of Tanzania. According to the Office

of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 78,000 Burundian refugees are now in camps in the United Republic, with negative consequences for the already strained relations between the two neighbours. There are approximately half a million internally displaced persons in Burundi, and only a modest level of humanitarian assistance is being provided to them. In these difficult circumstances, the humanitarian agencies have asked the Regional Sanctions Coordination Committee in Nairobi for exemptions needed to ensure the least possible hindrance to their work by the regional sanctions imposed on Burundi since 31 July 1996.

9. On the diplomatic front, the countries of the region have intensified their efforts to address the complex of problems confronting them, as demonstrated by the series of summits recently held at Brazzaville, Ouagadougou and Nairobi. However, none of these summits has been attended by leaders of all the States concerned and relations within the region and, to an increasing extent, between regions remain strained.

III. THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE

10. On 16 December 1996, I transmitted to the Security Council a letter dated 13 December from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations (S/1996/1025, annex) which stated that the Government of Canada had concluded that, with the return to Rwanda of the majority of refugees, the dispersal of the remaining number over large areas of eastern Zaire and the growing access of international humanitarian agencies to the remaining refugees, displaced persons and civilians at risk, the multinational force at the current authorized force level would be of very little utility. Canada would therefore withdraw its personnel from the Great Lakes region by 31 December 1996 and recommended that the Security Council terminate the mandate of the force, with effect from the same date.

11. In my report of 29 November 1996 (S/1996/993, para. 41), I observed that, as of that date, the nature, strength, composition, mandate and modus operandi of the multinational force envisaged under resolutions 1078 (1996) and 1080 (1996) were still under consideration by the Member States concerned, and that as long as no final decision had been taken on all those matters, it would not be possible to present to the Security Council a detailed concept of operations for the proposed follow-on operation. Those considerations apply with still greater force now that the Canadian Government has taken the decisions described in the letter of its Permanent Representative referred to above. Under the circumstances, therefore, I am not in a position to recommend to the Council the establishment of a United Nations operation to follow on from the multinational force.

IV. FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

12. It is evident from the present summary of the last few weeks' developments that major problems persist in the Great Lakes region, notwithstanding the welcome repatriation of a large part of the Rwandan refugees who were previously

in the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire. These problems include: intermittent hostilities across Zaire's borders with its eastern neighbours; internal conflict within Zaire; the future of the ex-FAR, the Interahamwe and their families who remain in Zaire, as well as in the United Republic; the unresolved conflict in Burundi; the prodigious demands made upon the Government of Rwanda by the massive return of refugees; and the continuing needs of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons who remain scattered in the region, particularly in Zaire.

13. These problems must continue to command the attention of the international community. The United Nations system is already devoting a considerable effort to them, especially in the humanitarian and developmental fields. Since November, a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator has had overall responsibility for the coordination of United Nations humanitarian work in the region. His main task is to ensure the coherence of the policies of all humanitarian partners there, to monitor the overall implementation of the programme in the region and to ensure consolidated inter-agency efforts to mobilize resources. A United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Flash Appeal was launched for the period from 1 November 1996 to 31 January 1997, with total requirements amounting to US$ 259 million. As of 18 December 1996, $112 million, amounting to 43 per cent of the total, had been contributed by the international community. Preparations are under way for a full-fledged Consolidated Appeal to meet humanitarian requirements for the remainder of 1997.

14. The United Nations is also involved in political activities, at the request of the Governments concerned, notably through the efforts of the various Special Envoys whom I have sent to the region in recent months, through the good offices of my Special Representative in Burundi, through the Human Rights Field Operations in Burundi and in Rwanda and the new office of the United Nations Human Rights Centre in Zaire, and through the electoral assistance mission in Zaire, which has now been in operation for nearly three months and which has been welcomed by the Government of Zaire and is receiving important support from that Government and financial assistance from interested Member States.

15. In these circumstances, I believe that there is a case for strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to perform three functions: the provision of good offices to those involved in the various conflicts in the region; the mobilization of international interest in, and support for, an integrated effort to address the region's manifold problems; and coordination of the work of the United Nations system as a whole. Such a strengthening of the political role of the United Nations would, of course, need to be undertaken in close consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with the agreement of the Governments concerned.

16. I am inclined to think that such a role would require the presence in the region of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who, as Mr. Chrétien has emphasized, would need to be endowed with adequate staff and logistic support, especially in the aviation and telecommunications fields. This would be option (a) in paragraph 33 of Mr. Chrétien's report (S/1996/1036, annex).

17. However, I believe that, given the fluid situation which persists in the region, it would be somewhat premature to take a decision to that effect in the

immediate future. I therefore propose, after consulting with the Secretary-General elect, to adopt something close to Mr. Chrétien's option (c) as an interim measure. This would involve sending a Special Envoy of senior rank to the region, to interested capitals outside the region and to the headquarters of OAU at regular intervals. The Special Envoy's principal function would be to confirm, to the satisfaction of the Secretary-General, that the option of appointing a resident Special Representative was still welcomed in the region, and would be assured sufficient support outside it, for that option to be a viable one. In addition to this exploratory mandate, the Special Envoy would also perform, to the extent possible, the kind of good offices, mobilization and coordination functions which I envisage for a resident Special Representative, as well as advising the Secretary-General on the future of United Nations technical assistance to the electoral process in Zaire.

19. It would be essential for the Special Envoy to be able to travel quickly and at ease in the region and to neighbouring parts of Africa. He or she too would therefore need adequate logistic support, as well as the necessary staff, and I would recommend that this option be proceeded with only if such support was assured.

20. Finally, it would be desirable for the Special Envoy to make his or her first visit to the region as early as possible in the New Year.

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S/1996/1064
23 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter to me of 16 December 1996 enclosing a letter from the Permanent Representative of Canada dated 13 December 1996 (S/1996/1046), which recommends the termination of the mandate of the multinational force established by the Security Council in its resolution 1080 (1996), has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council.

The members of the Security Council take note of the view of the Government of Canada expressed in the letter of 13 December 1996 and they agree that the functions of the multinational force have therefore come to an end.

The Security Council remains actively seized of the matter, and would welcome periodic reports on the situation on the Great Lakes region.

(Signed) Francesco Paolo FULCI
President of the Security Council

96-37542 (E) 231296

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/1065
24 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning the situation in Tajikistan (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anatoli M. ZLENKO
Permanent Representative
of Ukraine

96-37645 (E) 241296 241296

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Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

In Tajikistan, on 20 December 1996, 70 kilometres east of Dushanbe, representatives of the Tajik opposition seized 21 hostages. They included representatives of the State structures of Tajikistan and seven United Nations military observers, among them Captain D. Sukharev, a national of Ukraine.

These actions have endangered the lives and safety of the persons seized, and constitute a gross violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Ukraine is convinced that hostage-taking is an absolutely unacceptable means of attaining political objectives which will have an extremely negative impact on the entire process of national reconciliation in Tajikistan.

There is special concern in Ukraine over the dangerous actions directed against the United Nations international observers, which can be regarded as a challenge to the entire international community in the name of which they are performing their peacekeeping mission.

Ukraine calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all the persons seized, and for the international status of the United Nations peacekeepers to be strictly respected.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is taking active diplomatic measures to secure the release of the Ukrainian national.

Kiev, 20 December 1996

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S/1996/1066
24 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 23 December 1996, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I would appreciate your bringing it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-37657 (E) 241296 251296

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Annex

Letter dated 23 December 1996 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1031, I attach the thirteenth and final report on IFOR operations. I would appreciate your making this report available to the UN Security Council.

On 20th December 1996 the IFOR mandate came to an end. In this, my last monthly report on IFOR operations, I think it appropriate to take the opportunity briefly to review the achievements of the last year, and to look ahead to some of the challenges facing the new Stabilization Force (SFOR) authorised by Security Council Resolution 1088.

IFOR's deployment to Bosnia, following the signature of the Peace Agreement and under the authority of UNSC Resolution 1031, marked NATO's first-ever operation out-of-area and its first-ever with non-NATO countries. Both Partnership for Peace (PFP) nations, including Russia, and others played a major part in ensuring its success. IFOR deployed for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR over a very short period in the middle of winter. The efficiency with which this took place is a tribute to the commitment and efficiency of all concerned. Sixteen NATO and eighteen non-NATO nations contributed over 60,000 troops and facilities. In the air, more than 300 aircraft were assigned from 11 NATO nations, and over 29,700 sorties were flown. At sea, some 20 ships from 11 NATO nations were routinely involved on a day-to-day basis in the joint NATO/WEU embargo enforcement operation. In addition, there were at any one time up to 10 ships from 5 NATO nations involved in mine counter-measures operations.

Throughout its mandate, IFOR's primary responsibility was to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. With great success, it monitored the cessation of hostilities, ensured the withdrawal from the Zone of Separation of forces and weapons belonging to the former warring factions, and ensured compliance with the requirement to store aircraft, air defence and heavy weapons in IFOR-approved cantonments. In total, IFOR monitored 805 sites throughout Bosnia.

IFOR also contributed substantially to encouraging freedom of movement thanks to its many civil engineering projects. Approximately 2,500 km of roads were opened up, including 64 bridge projects that are planned, operational or underway. In addition, IFOR helped to re-establish Bosnia's railways with the result that, since 13th September, Bosnia has been linked to the rest of Europe by rail. Air operations were restored at a number of airports, and, on the local level, IFOR supported bus lines organized by the UNHCR. Despite these achievements, however, freedom of movement and particularly freedom of return are still being severely hampered by widespread reluctance of each ethnic group to accept the return of refugees belonging to another ethnic group. There have been many cases of forced expulsions and the destruction of homes. Mines also continue to pose a major impediment to achieving greater freedom of movement, and are a great danger to all, whether military or civilian. It is crucial, therefore, that demining takes place as rapidly as possible.

Much assistance was also provided by IFOR to the many international civil agencies and organizations operating within Bosnia. Continuous and close support was provided, in particular, to the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), most notably during the preparation and peaceful conduct of the national and regional elections in September and in the implementation of the Article II confidence and security building measures and the Article IV sub-regional arms control.

IFOR broke the cycle of Spring offensives by the warring parties, and played a major part in bringing peace, albeit a fragile one, to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our gratitude must go to the troops on the ground, to their commanders and to all the nations who have generously contributed to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR. Their success over the past year has not been without cost. In the course of the Operation, IFOR suffered a total of 265 casualties, of which 52 were fatal. I am sure that you join me in extending the deepest sympathy to the families of those who have died and to those wounded in the cause of peace. It is a tribute to the professionalism and discipline of the Force that so few casualties were caused by military action.

The conferences in Paris and London on 14th November and 4th and 5th December charted the way forward in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The next stage is to build upon the achievements of the past year: to consolidate peace; to encourage reconciliation and economic, political and social regeneration; and to take the steps needed to restore a multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina to economic health and prosperity and to enable it to take its rightful place in the region and in Europe. This will require a sustained effort in the civil field on the part of the international community and of the leaders and people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

SFOR will be approximately half the size of IFOR. In building on IFOR's achievements, it will concentrate on helping to ensure stability and security during the 18 months of its mission. It will contribute to creating a secure environment that will enable responsibility for maintaining peace to be transferred from military enforcement to political and civil control, with the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves assuming increasing responsibility for the maintenance of peace. A major milestone in consolidating the peace in 1997 will be the conduct of the municipal elections. SFOR will be ready to support these elections within the limits of its mandate and reduced resources. It will also provide selective support, within its more limited capabilities, to civilian agencies.

Much has been achieved in the past year, but much remains to be done. SFOR will implement its mandate as professionally as IFOR and will play its full part in helping to bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In submitting this final report on IFOR, I should like to take the opportunity of expressing my personal thanks to you for your personal commitment to our shared cause of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

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Appendix

Thirteenth Report to the UN Security Council on IFOR Operations

IFOR Operations

1. During December, which was the last month of operation of the multi-national implementation force (IFOR), the force comprised approximately 40,000 personnel deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Contributions came from all the NATO countries and, with Bulgaria joining IFOR on 13th December, from 18 non-NATO countries. With the IFOR mandate coming to an end on 20th December, the number of personnel decreased over the last month of the mandate, as nations continued to transfer their forces out of the theatre. However, IFOR continued to maintain a mission-capable force until the end of its mandate.

2. IFOR air assets continued to provide the capability required to secure the air space, defend and support IFOR ground forces, provide support to civilian agencies within mission capabilities, and monitor compliance with the Peace Agreement. IFOR maritime assets also remained deployed in support of the Operation.

3. IFOR continued to fulfil its primary mission to implement the military tasks of the Peace Agreement. IFOR troops continued to inspect cantonment sites, to confiscate and destroy weapons, and to increase patrolling where necessary in order to counter the risks arising from increased tension in and around the Zone of Separation (ZOS) and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). Subject to the fulfilment of this primary mission, IFOR continued to provide support to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and to the other civilian organizations in theatre.

4. IFOR continued to provide support to the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) through regular, coordinated close air support training missions over Eastern Slavonia.

Cooperation and Compliance by the Parties

5. The Parties have remained in general overall compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. However, unauthorized weapons continue to be confiscated, partly as a result of the joint inspections of police stations which were carried out by IFOR and the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) over the past month. These inspections resulted in the confiscation and destruction of a large number of unauthorized weapons, mainly small arms and ammunition, although numerous mines and light mortars were also discovered. In addition, over the past month, during weapons storage site inspections, discrepancies in inventories were found and various types of undeclared weapons, again mainly small arms, were confiscated, together with ammunition.

6. With respect to the continued presence of unauthorized individuals in the ZOS, IFOR increased patrolling in and around the ZOS. As a result, IFOR

registered only one ZOS violation, during the first two weeks of December, involving 3 unarmed ABiH soldiers.

7. Freedom of Movement (FOM) and Freedom of Return (FOR) continued to give rise for concern, and there was increased tension in the city of Mostar over the reporting period, with Bosnian Croats, mainly criminal gangs, but including elements from the Bosnian Croat Army, evicting a number of Bosniacs from their homes. IFOR warned the Bosnian Croats of the consequences of continuing such evictions. Only 3 illegal checkpoints have been registered over recent weeks; but the population still enjoys very little FOM, as was emphasized during the recent Peace Implementation Council meeting in London. Indeed, IFOR suspects all Parties of continuing to use mobile, fast-moving checkpoints in order to hinder FOM.

8. Minefields continue to pose a very great problem in the theatre. Mine-clearing is one of the major obstacles to economic reconstruction and to FOM and FOR; in the period since the 3rd October, when COMARRC linked minefield lifting with the right to train and move, only 43 minefields have been lifted. It is unlikely now, given the weather, that mine-clearing operations will resume before next Spring. It is currently estimated that only 10-11% of the known minefields have been cleared.

Cooperation with International Organizations

9. IFOR's close cooperation with the international civil organizations in Bosnia continued over the reporting period, with support being provided to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in its efforts to develop the common institutions and the supporting constitutional framework.

10. As reported above, IFOR continued to cooperate with the IPTF, most recently during the latter's inspection of civilian police stations. IFOR support was also provided to the IPTF in Mostar in monitoring the local police force there.

Transition from IFOR to the Stabilization Force (SFOR)

11. Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1088 on 12th December, and following consultation with the Non-NATO contributors, the North Atlantic Council approved the Operations Plan (OPLAN) for Operation JOINT GUARD on 16th December 1996. NATO Defence Ministers subsequently authorized SACEUR to send the Activation Order (ACTORD) activating SFOR on 20th December. Transfer of Authority from IFOR to SFOR took place on that date.

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S/1996/1067
24 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of the Security Council's request that I report, at least once a year, on the progress made on standby arrangements with Member States concerning their possible contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations (S/PRST/1994/22). It covers developments since the submission of my previous report on the subject on 10 November 1995 (S/1995/943).

II. CONCEPT

2. The concept of standby arrangements for peacekeeping operations remains as described in detail in my previous report. In brief, its purpose is to have a precise understanding of the forces and other capabilities a Member State will have available at an agreed state of readiness, should it agree to contribute to a peacekeeping operation. Such resources may include military units, individual civilian and military personnel (e.g., police, military observers), specialized services, equipment and other capabilities. The key element in the system of standby arrangements is the exchange of detailed information to facilitate planning and preparation for both the participating Member States and the United Nations.

III. CURRENT STATUS

3. I am pleased to report that further progress has been made since my previous report. Last year, I reported that 47 Member States had confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources totalling some 55,000 personnel that could, in principle, be called upon. As of 30 November 1996, 62 Member States have now made such a confirmation, involving a total of some 80,000 personnel.

4. The participating Member States are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad,

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Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Five Member States, Austria, Denmark, Ghana, Jordan and Malaysia, have formalized their standby contributions through a memorandum of understanding.

5. The resources involved are depicted in annex I to the present report. The total of 80,000 includes elements of different sizes, varying from infantry battalions to individual military observers, and cover the whole range of components envisaged for peacekeeping operations. The bulk of resources consist of infantry; there continues to be a need for additional resources to complement that number of infantry with the necessary logistic support, especially in the areas of sealift/airlift, communications, multi-role logistics, transport, health services, engineering, mine-clearing and transport utility aircraft. There is also a need for more civilian police personnel. The Secretariat will continue its discussions to seek the broadest possible participation by Member States as well as to arrive at a proper mix of troops and supporting units.

6. Standby arrangements also cover civilian resources provided by Governments for peacekeeping operations. Little progress has been achieved so far in this field. However, the Secretariat has recently observed a growing interest of Governments in contributing civilian resources and services which, in some cases, substitute for military resources. One clear example is the use of civilian organizations providing medical support in peacekeeping operations.

7. The Secretariat continued to expand its database with detailed information from the participating Governments. Such information includes, first of all, information on the specific capabilities of the resources covered by the standby arrangements. This information is needed at an early stage of planning for a peacekeeping operation to establish which units could be called upon to perform the expected tasks. At later stages of planning, the Secretariat will require more detailed information, such as the response time for each individual unit, any political or material preconditions, period of self-sufficiency, level of equipment, probable port of departure, total surface/volume/weight, number and types of vehicles, number of containers, information on particularly large or heavy items, and information on dangerous cargo (e.g., ammunition), and any specific handling instructions. This information is required to help the Secretariat to establish the requirements of peacekeeping forces and of individual units, in planning sea/airlift provisions and addressing any deficiencies in the composition and equipment of peacekeeping units. Of the 62 participating Member States, 41 have provided information on specific capabilities. The information available under the standby arrangements proved most helpful in the planning for and subsequent deployment to peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Angola and the former Yugoslavia, in particular the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES).

IV. RAPID DEPLOYMENT

8. An important objective of the standby arrangements system is to tackle the problem of the often long period between a decision by the Security Council to establish an operation and the arrival of troops and equipment in the mission area. A key element in this regard is response time, defined as the period between the time the request to provide resources is made and the time these resources are ready for airlift/sealift to the mission area.

9. The Secretariat has registered response times according to the declared individual capacities of Member States. The declared response times for confirmed standby resources vary from 7 days to more than 90 days. Some 40 per cent of the standby resources have a response time of 30 days or less; 16 per cent have a response time of 60 days; 3 per cent have a response time of 90 days; the remaining 41 per cent have a response time of over 90 days. The grouping of resources with their response time is shown in annex II to the present report.

10. This implies that a significant proportion of the resources in the standby arrangements is at a high level of readiness. However, this in itself does not give the United Nations a capacity for rapid deployment. It should be borne in mind that the speed of deployment is contingent on several other factors, including political approval and support at the national level, availability of airlift/sealift, a capacity for mission management and logistic sustainment in the field, as well as the conclusion of the necessary administrative procedures.

11. In this regard, I draw attention to the progress made in the reform of the procedures for determining reimbursement to Member States for contingent-owned equipment, in particular, the elaboration of a contribution agreement for the provision of personnel, equipment and services in support of peacekeeping operations.[1] The introduction of these new procedures, which include arrangements for the self-sustainment of troops, is expected to result in a decrease of the level of logistic support to be provided by the United Nations. Currently, the United Nations requires units to deploy in the mission with the means to sustain themselves for a minimum period of 60 days, in order to allow the United Nations adequate time to establish its logistic support capacity.

12. The above-mentioned contribution agreement should, in principle, be signed before the deployment of the resources to the mission area. In this connection, I believe that a significant amount of time could be saved if preliminary contribution agreements were to be drawn up in advance between the Secretariat and participating Member States on the basis of information made available under the standby arrangements system. These preliminary agreements could then be finalized quickly before deployment.

13. An important effort by the United Nations to facilitate rapid deployment is the development of a rapidly deployable mission headquarters (RDMHQ). In the past, military contingents and other components arrived in the mission area and operated for extended periods without a proper mission headquarters. To overcome this problem, and in keeping with the recommendation of the General Assembly contained in resolution 50/30 of 6 December 1995, I have decided to establish within the Secretariat the skeleton of a RDMHQ. In brief, this RDMHQ would enable the United Nations to deploy quickly a cohesive team of essential

civilian and military personnel to the mission area. This would ensure that the deployment and initial phases of a peacekeeping operation receive the necessary management and guidance. The RDMHQ would consist of earmarked personnel currently in the Secretariat, personnel nominated by Governments who would remain in their home country until deployment, and a small core of personnel for functions which will require full-time attention. The RDMHQ could remain in the mission area for the first three to six months, during which time it would be replaced, in a gradual fashion, by a mission headquarters staffed by personnel recruited for that purpose. It is hoped that the RDMHQ will be functional in early 1997.

V. EQUIPMENT

14. In principle, all units made available under the standby arrangements should be fully equipped. This, however, may not be achievable for all contributing countries. It is therefore important to provide information on the level and status of equipment at the time a standby arrangement is agreed upon. This would enable the Secretariat to identify any gaps and to seek solutions to fill them as early as possible.

15. In this regard, I should emphasize that the Secretariat has only a very limited capacity to maintain equipment made available by Governments to the United Nations and to train personnel in its use. I have therefore suggested that partnerships be established between Governments that need equipment and those ready to provide it. Such bilateral partnerships can be made part of a standby arrangement with either one or both Governments. Preferably, such partnerships should be concluded directly between Governments and include such aspects as training and maintenance. The new procedures for determining reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment allow Member States to take the lead in providing support to contingents from another country, which support is subject to reimbursement by the United Nations under pre-established conditions and rates. Alternatively, the Secretariat may identify, from the resources in its database, a possible match of personnel with equipment and suggest to Governments that they set up a partnership.

VI. FINAL REMARKS

16. There has been encouraging progress in the number of Member States participating in the standby arrangements system. However, the need remains to broaden the geographical base of available resources as well as to achieve a proper mix of troops and supporting units. There has also been progress, albeit modest, towards a rapid deployment capability. I welcome, in particular, the efforts by Member States to increase the military readiness of troops earmarked for peacekeeping duties. This said, I should like to underscore that rapid deployment is conditional on several other factors, highlighted in the report, deserving of equal attention. The Secretariat, for its part, will continue its dialogue with Member States to address these issues.

Notes

[1] A/50/995, annex.

Annex I

SBA RESOURCES POOL

(breakdown by functions)



Annex II

GROUPING OF SBA RESOURCES POOL

(by response time)



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24 December 1996

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LETTER DATED 23 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KENYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you the full text of the communiqué of the Second Regional Summit on the Crisis in the Great Lakes Region, held at Nairobi on 16 and 17 December 1996.

I should therefore be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Njuguna M. MAHUGU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Communiqué of the Second Regional Summit on the Crisis in the Great Lakes Region, held at Nairobi on 16 and 17 December 1996

1. At the invitation of President Daniel T. arap Moi, Presidents Robert G. Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Yoweri K. Museveni of Uganda, Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, Issaias Afworki of Eritrea, Nelson R. Mandela of South Africa, Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda, Benjamin W. Mkapa of the United Republic of Tanzania and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia met at Nairobi from 16 to 17 December 1996, to deliberate on the conflict in the Great Lakes region.

2. Also participating in the Summit were Mr. Ferdinand Oyono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cameroon, representing President Paul Biya, Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU, and Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, facilitator of the peace process.

3. The Summit reviewed recent developments in the region and noted the easing of the refugee problem in eastern Zaire. The Summit, however, expressed concern that the security situation had deteriorated further since the Nairobi summit of 5 November 1996.

4. The Summit noted with regret that the ceasefire called for in eastern Zaire by the 5 November 1996 summit had not been effected. To this end, the Summit called upon the parties to the conflict to commit themselves to a negotiated, peaceful settlement. Consequently, the Summit directed the Ministers for Foreign Affairs to establish a follow-up mechanism.

5. The Summit reiterated its commitment to the territorial integrity of Zaire in accordance with the OAU charter, and in particular, the Cairo Declaration of 1964 on the territorial integrity and inviolability of national boundaries as inherited at independence[1] and called for non-intervention and an end to cross-border incursions.

6. The Summit welcomed the assurance by President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire to the Foreign Ministers mandated to convey the decisions of the Nairobi summit of 5 November 1996 that the Government of Zaire recognizes the inalienable right to citizenship and nationality of all people within its internationally recognized boundaries, as stipulated in the OAU charter and other relevant international conventions. The Summit considers this assurance a significant step in the search for a lasting solution to the crisis.

7. The Summit expressed regret that the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 1078 (1996) failed to consider the decisions of the Nairobi summit of 5 November 1996[2] and those of the 11 November 1996 meeting of the OAU Central Organ on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution[3] on the deployment of a neutral force in eastern Zaire.

8. The Summit observed that a large number of Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire had returned to Rwanda for resettlement and expressed appreciation to the

international community for its assistance and urged it to continue to support efforts to resettle, rehabilitate and reintegrate the returnees.

9. The Summit called upon the international community:

(a) To provide substantial assistance for those refugees who have returned to Rwanda;

(b) To encourage the remaining bona fide refugees still in Zaire, as well as those in the United Republic of Tanzania, to return to their respective countries.

10. The Summit decided to entrust Presidents Moi of Kenya, Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Mandela of South Africa and Biya of Cameroon (current Chairman of OAU), acting on behalf of all the leaders of the region, to take the necessary initiatives and steps aimed at assisting in the ending of the conflict in eastern Zaire and promoting peace, stability and security in the country and in the Great Lakes region.

11. The Summit expressed its appreciation to President Daniel T. arap Moi for hosting the Second Summit on the Great Lakes Region at Nairobi and to the Government and the people of the Republic of Kenya, for the warm welcome and hospitality accorded to the delegations.

Notes

[1] See A/5763.

[2] S/1996/914, annex.

[3] S/1996/922, appendix.